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Abstract Recent scholarship in philosophy, law, and in-
formation systems suggests that respecting privacy entails
understanding the implicit privacy norms about what, why,
and to whom information is shared within specific rela-
tionships. These social contracts are important to under-
stand if firms are to adequately manage the privacy
expectations of stakeholders. This paper explores a social
contract approach to developing, acknowledging, and
protecting privacy norms within specific contexts. While
privacy as a social contract—a mutually beneficial agree-
ment within a community about sharing and using infor-
mation—has been introduced theoretically and empirically,
the full impact on firms of an alternative framework to
respecting the privacy expectations of stakeholders has not
been examined. The goal of this paper is to examine how
privacy norms develop through social contract’s narrative,
to redescribe privacy violations given the social contract
approach, and to critically examine the role of business as a
contractor in developing privacy norms. A social contract
narrative dealing specifically with issues of privacy is an
important next step in exploring a social contract approach
to privacy. Here, the narrative is used to explain to analyze
the dynamic process of privacy norm generation within
particular communities. Based on this narrative, indi-
viduals within a given community discriminately share
information with a particular set of obligations in mind as
to who has access to the information and how it will be
used. Rather than giving away privacy, individuals dis-
criminately share information within a particular
community and with norms governing the use of their in-
formation. Similar to contractual business ethics’ impact on
global commerce in explaining how and why norms vary
across global contexts, the social contract approach to
privacy explains how and why norms vary across com-
munities of actors. Focusing on agreements around privacy
expectations shifts the responsibility of firms from ade-
quate notification to the responsibility of firms as con-
tractors to maintain a mutually beneficial and sustainable
solution.
Keywords Privacy  Online  Social contract  Fair
Information Practices  Internet  Technology
Consider three illustrative privacy issues online:
(1) Through ‘Sponsored Stories,’ Facebook users who
clicked on ‘like’ buttons had pictures of themselves
with an endorsement sent to their friends in a what
looked like sponsored advertising (Kravets 2012).
(2) The travel site Orbitz tracks how users arrived at
their site in order to prioritize search results: if a user
arrived at Orbitz from a competitor’s site, Orbitz
may prioritize results based on price (Mattioli 2012).
Similarly, Facebook mines users’ browser history in
order to target advertising.
(3) Verizon offers a service—Precision Market In-
sights—to business customers to mine Verizon’s
customer call and web browsing information in order
to map where people are located and the types of
services they purchase and use (Hill 2012). In an
aptly titled article: ‘‘Verizon Very Excited That It
Can Track Everything Phone Users Do And Sell
That To Whomever Is Interested,’’ Kashmir Hill
outlines the service Verizon offers to business’ to
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track their potential customers: ‘‘we [Verizon]
understand what our customers’ daily activity stream
is…,’’ and Verizon sells that activity stream to their
commercial customers.
In each case, individuals willingly divulged informa-
tion—clicked like, visited a travel site, watched a basket-
ball game in a stadium—yet held different privacy
expectations within the different contexts. For example,
location information is expected to be used and tracked
from a travel website (Martin and Shilton 2015); yet it is a
surprise when information is used to track movement to
and from a basketball game. Individuals share preferences
with some friends—but not all. Users’ different norms and
expectations across contexts has been a source of frustra-
tion to firms and academics alike.
To explain variances in privacy expectations, previous
work relies on a static, universal definition of privacy ex-
pectations and measures differences in individuals’ con-
cerns, attitudes, or valuations of privacy as illustrated in
Table 1. In privacy scholarship, the access-view of privacy
suggests that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy so long as they and their information are inacces-
sible or hidden (Warren and Brandeis 1890; Elgesem 1999;
Persson and Hansson 2003; Schoeman 1984; Posner 1981).
Online, the access-view would categorize the act of sharing
information as necessarily giving up any expectation of
privacy. When individuals use a phone, watch a basketball
game, or click ‘like,’ individuals are seen as not having
privacy expectations because all of the information was
accessible. The question then becomes, ‘why did the users
divulge the information at all?’
Alternatively, the control-view of privacy (Westin 1967;
Alder et al. 2007; Margulis 1977; Altman 1975; Moor
1997) suggests that relinquishing control of information to
another party renders the individual without any reasonable
expectation of privacy. Online, the control-view of privacy
is regulated through adequate notice and choice in Fair
Information Practices (FIPs; Bennett 1992; Ashworth and
Free 2006; Peslak 2005; Culnan and Armstrong 1999;
Bowie and Jamal 2006). FIPs allow for the contempora-
neous disclosure of information and respect of privacy
norms while online.1 Although popular, notice and choice
statements may be immaterial—or nonfactors—to
Table 1 Ethical implications of privacy approaches
Privacy approach and JBE scholarship Privacy defined as Ethical implications
Access view
Bonner (2007), Rowan (2000), Manning
(1997), Miller and Weckert (2000), Brown
(1996), Charters (2002), and Persson and
Hansson (2003)
‘‘right to be left along’’ (Peslak 2005, p. 329) Respondents who disclose or give access to
information are seen as not valuing privacy
(e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags 2005). Since
no privacy expectations exist after the
disclosure of information, firms mistakenly
believe or are told that no obligations to
‘respect’ privacy exist post-disclosure.
Intrusions or violations of privacy are then
‘justified: For example, monitoring of calls at
work is seen as a violation but ethical
(Persson and Hansson 2003)
Control/FIP
Hsu and Kuo (2003), Angst (2009), Roman
and Cuestas (2008), Lally (1996), Shaw
(2003), and Alder et al. (2007)
‘‘the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others’’
(Pollach 2005, p. 222)
Individuals are seen as controlling information
through the informed consent within Fair
Information Practices (FIPs). Individuals are
responsible to understand the FIP of the firm
through notice and choice.
Firms have an incentive to only notify—no
matter how outrageous the practice (Martin
2013)
Context-dependent norms
(Privacy as a social contract)
For example, Brown (1996), Cranford
(1998), Introna and Pouloudi (1999), and
Martin (2012)
‘‘negotiated information norms within a
particular community or situation’’ (Martin
2012, p. 520)
Information flow that is ethical meets privacy
expectations by definition. For example, drug
testing meets the requirements of contextual
integrity, is ethical, and is not a privacy
violation (Cranford 1998).
Ethicists examine ‘‘what constitutes privacy
concerns…and what they feel privacy is’’
(Kyo et al. 2007), and firms would be asked
to take a more inductive approach to
identifying privacy expectations
1 See Federal Trade Commission (2012a, b) ‘‘Protecting Consumer
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Business
and Policymakers’’, Federal Trade Commission’s Fair Information
Practice Principles, and the White House’s Consumer Data Privacy in
a Networked World (February 2012).
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assessments about the appropriateness and inappropriate-
ness of the information transmitted within a particular
context. In fact, each of the three examples was argued to
comply with the written privacy notices, and users agreed
to the notice upon engaging with the service; yet, all three
examples caused privacy advocates to bring lawsuits or
provided the impetus for articles exposing the firms’ be-
havior. In other words, individuals, employees, users, and
consumers make judgments about privacy expectations and
violations regardless of the notice and choice policy in
many situations.
Recent work on privacy suggests that privacy norms can
be viewed asmutually beneficial and sustainable agreements
within a community (Martin 2012) or as context-dependent
norms (Nissenbaum 2004, 2009). These social contracts are
the unstated agreements that individuals and groups make in
contexts, communities, and relationships. Studies also sub-
stantiate the theory: 71 % of respondents would disclose
within an established relationship (Louis Harris and Asso-
ciates and Westin 1997; Culnan and Bies 2003), and indi-
viduals within a particular community, such as teams or
young adults, develop substantive privacy norms not easily
recognized or understood by outsiders (Martin 2012; Turow
et al. 2009). In other words, individuals give access to in-
formation within a particular context with an understanding
of the privacy rules that govern that context.
Understanding the factors that drive mutually beneficial
and sustainable privacy norms within communities is im-
portant to firms in order to best meet the privacy expec-
tations of stakeholders such as consumers, users, and
employees.2 Not only does meeting consumer privacy ex-
pectations increase purchase intentions and consumers’
likelihood to transact with a firm (Cases et al. 2010;
Eastlick et al. 2006), but meeting consumer privacy ex-
pectations also increases trust in a firm (McCole et al.
2010), while violating privacy expectations leads to ad-
verse consumer reactions (Miyazaki 2009). Importantly for
business ethicists, privacy violations are experienced as
individual harms (Calo 2011) and as unfair acts (Ashworth
and Free 2006).
While privacy as a social contract—a mutually benefi-
cial agreement within a community about how information
is used and shared—has been introduced theoretically
(Culnan and Bies 2003) and empirically (Martin 2012), the
full impact on firms of an alternative framework to re-
specting the privacy expectations of users, consumers, and
employees has not been examined. Importantly for re-
searchers and firms, questions remain about how to identify
microsocial contract norms about privacy and what is taken
into consideration in forming those privacy norms.
This paper further develops a social contract approach to
generating, acknowledging, and protecting privacy norms
within specific contexts (Martin 2012). The goal of this
paper is to examine how information norms develop
through a social contract narrative, to reframe possible
privacy violations of business given the social contract
approach to privacy, and to critically examine the role of
business as a contractor in developing privacy norms. The
social contract approach ‘‘need not—and seldom does—
eliminate all questions from a moral quandary. But it can
provide logical vantage points from which to view an
ethical quandary and, in turn, point towards a solution’’
(Donaldson and Dunfee 2003, p. 115).
Understanding the underpinnings of social contract pri-
vacy norms will allow researchers and practitioners to
identify the factors driving privacy expectations. Based on
this narrative, individuals within a given community dis-
criminately share information with a particular set of obli-
gations in mind as to who has access to the information and
how it will be used. In other words, rather than giving away
privacy, individuals discriminately share information within
a particular community and with norms governing the use of
their information. Most importantly for business and busi-
ness ethics, privacy as a social contract shifts the focus from
gaining the consent from the user, individual, employee, or
consumer to the responsibilities of the firm as a contractor to
maintain a mutually beneficial and sustainable solution. The
beginning of this move can be seen in online sites and ap-
plications, such as diaspora,* TOR, DuckDuckGo, and
YikYak, which place understanding andmeeting the privacy
expectations of users as part of their value proposition.
This paper proceeds as follows.
• First, the social contract approach to privacy is
explored by connecting privacy scholarship with exist-
ing social contract theory within business ethics—
namely, Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT).
• Second, I examine the social contract narrative
specifically around privacy; this social contract con-
struct grounds microsocial contract privacy norms as
the natural outgrowth of individuals living in a
community. The narrative offered here suggests that
individuals have an interest in discriminately sharing
information within a particular community and helps
explain the factors that contractors take into consid-
eration in forming privacy expectations.
• Third, online privacy violations are redescribed given
the social contract approach to privacy to better
understand how seemingly disparate privacy violations
(Solove 2006) are related through a social contract
approach to privacy.
2 In the words of social contract theorists, communities are best able
to develop moral fabric supportive of efficiency and pre-existing
community values (Donaldson and Dunfee 1999). I wish to thank
Tom Donaldson for making this point.
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• Fourth, I discuss the implications of the social contract
approach to privacy and the social contract narrative for
the alternative theories of privacy, which are neither
descriptively valid nor prescriptively useful.
• Finally, I critically examine the role of business as a
contractor in developing privacy norms and outline
implications of a social contract approach to privacy on
management research and practice in the implications
and conclusion.
Privacy as a Social Contract
While a social contract approach to privacy has been
suggested generally, here I examine what privacy as a
social contract would entail within business ethics and
ISCT before developing the social contract narrative.
Previous Links Between Privacy and Social Contract
Theory
A growing body of theoretical scholarship has focused on
privacy as contextually defined, where privacy norms are
defined and examined within a specific set of relationships,
situations, or contexts (Nissenbaum 2004, 2009; Solove
2006; Martin 2012; Stutzman and Hartzog 2012; Moor
1997; Jiang et al. 2002). Within these contextually defined
privacy approaches, what is and is not private is dependent
on relationships, actors, information, and context (Nis-
senbaum 2004, 2009; Solove 2006; Grimmelmann 2010;
Tufekci 2008a, b; Sloan and Warner 2013). The rules used
to develop privacy norms vary across contexts; therefore
violations of privacy occur when these negotiated, context-
dependent rules are broken.3
Contextually dependent or relationship-dependent ap-
proaches to privacy, where privacy rules are negotiated and
evolve within particular contexts or relationships, mirror a
social contract approach to norms (Martin 2012). For ex-
ample, privacy as contextual integrity suggests that privacy
is respected when an information exchange meets the pri-
vacy norms of a context or a community of actors. These
norms include not only the type of information expected,
but also who will be able to see and use the information as
well as the transmission principles associated with the in-
formation (Nissenbaum 2009). Similarly, social contract
theory suggests that behavior, such as economic transac-
tions or exchanges of information (Martin 2012), that
reside within a community and whose effects reside within
the community’s should be governed by the communities’
locally negotiated norms.
Social Contract Theory in Business Ethics
Within business ethics, the conversation around social
contract theory centers on Donaldson and Dunfee’s ISCT
(1994, 1995, 1999) and Heugens et al.’s Contractualist
Business Ethics (2006).4 While research has focused less
on the application of ISCT and more on the philosophical
underpinnings of ISCT (Heugens et al. 2006, p. 729), ISCT
has been utilized to explore particular ethical issues pre-
viously (Dunfee 2006, p. 313) including financial reporting
and governance (Campbell et al 2003), marketing (Dunfee
et al. 1999), lying (Ross and Robertson 2000), deviance in
organizations (Warren 2003), marketing credit to college
students (Lucas 2001), and Internet adoption in the Arab
world (Loch et al. 2003).
Of particular relevance to privacy, ISCT delineates two
types of agreements, as cogently described by Donaldson
and Dunfee (1999). First, a macrosocial contract sets up
the space for individuals to develop rules of engagement—
including privacy norms—within a particular community.
Local communities are more than simply two-party rela-
tionships. A community is a ‘‘self-defined, self-circum-
scribed group of people who interact in the context of
shared tasks, values, or goals and who are capable of
establishing norms of ethical behavior for themselves’’
(Donaldson and Dunfee 1999, p. 262). Marriages, friends,
teams, work groups, organizations, and organization–s-
takeholder relationships develop privacy norms particular
to their community.
Second, contractors create and negotiate microsocial
contracts within the community in order to resolve issues
and place constraints on behavior. For example, Verizon’s
collection of phone record data—the metadata of every
phone call including the caller, recipient, phone number,
duration, and (possibly) the GPS location information,
would be within a microsocial contract between contractors
(users) and Verizon would be expected to respect those
privacy expectations with their customers regardless of the
3 This negotiation over privacy norms is not synonymous with
privacy as a commodity (Smith et al. 2011), a privacy calculus
(Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Dinev and Hart 2006), or a second
exchange (Culnan and Bies 2003), all of which assume individuals
relinquish privacy in order to gain something in return. In other
words, individuals are seen as giving up some measure of privacy to
benefit from a transaction (e.g., customizing products or using
electronic health records or having books suggested online). In this
paper, the negotiation is over the privacy norm function: actors within
a context negotiate what the privacy rules will be while retaining
every expectation of privacy. See also Martin (2013).
4 A social contract approach has previously been applied to delineate
norms across geographical boundaries (Donaldson and Dunfee 1995),
distribute goods (Walzer 1983), assign property rights (Coase 1960),
or develop a system of right and wrong (Dennett 1995, 2003). Here,
the social contract approach is employed to understand how privacy
norms are formed within particular communities.
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substance of the notice in the user agreement. Similarly,
Facebook users have expectations as to who sees their in-
formation and how it is used (Martin 2011) regardless of
the privacy notices—including how user information is
manipulated for experiments (Albergotti 2014b). Em-
pirically, respondents within a particular community have a
better understanding of the privacy norms than outsiders
(Martin 2012).
ISCT allows for locally negotiated microsocial contracts
as well as the universal principles that transcend commu-
nities. The communities are afforded the moral free space
to generate community-specific moral rules consistent with
their members’ preference and experiences (Donaldson and
Dunfee 1999, p. 83; Dunfee 2006, p. 315). However, these
communities must abide by procedural hypernorms of
consent—usually manifest through the right of contractors
to have voice and to exit. Microsocial contracts are only
legitimate if the agreements conform to the procedural
hypernorms of consent, voice, and exit; and, microsocial
contracts around privacy norms only bind contractors if the
agreements are legitimate (Donaldson and Dunfee 1999).5
Allowing privacy rules to vary based on the community
or relationship mirrors expectations of privacy in the world.
Similar to contractual business ethics’ impact on global
commerce in explaining how and why norms may vary
across global contexts (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Van
Oosterhout and Heugens 2009), the social contract ap-
proach to privacy explains how and why norms may vary
across communities of actors with important implications
to research and practice.
Social Contract Narrative for Privacy
An important next step in exploring a social contract ap-
proach to privacy is the social contract narrative. The
narrative can justify the moral rightness of a principle,
explain the social and institutional fabric of a society (e.g.,
Nozick 1974), or explain the emergence, persistence, or
stability of an extant social contract (Heugens et al. 2006).
Here, a midlevel social contract narrative is used to explain
and analyze the dynamic process of privacy norm gen-
eration within particular communities.6 Table 2 illustrates
the social contract narrative applied here.
The first step in walking through a social contract nar-
rative is to specify an initial position. This position is a
priori any agreement between parties and provides the
setting for reasonable contracting where individuals are
assumed to have (1) an initial state and (2) behavioral
tendencies. This first step provides the setting to create an
agreement and asks not only what privacy norms would
contractors agree to but also what do contractors take into
consideration? For firms and business ethicists, the output
of this narrative will provide key facets of the microsocial
contracts about privacy and the factors that contractors—
such as users, consumers, and employees—take into con-
siderations in developing privacy norms.
Initial Position
For an initial state, one would need to imagine a world
where individuals have no communication or interaction
with others and are in a state where information can easily
remain inaccessible. Individuals in this initial state would
live and work by themselves and maintain their living
environment independently. Privacy, in such a world, only
requires that individuals keep a solitary existence and not
give access to their information to anyone. In this position,
the individual is able to maintain privacy by remaining
alone and hidden. This initial state would constitute a
scattering of recluses.
In fact, this initial state remains a theme throughout
privacy scholarship in that individuals continue to have an
interest in being inaccessible to others by remaining iso-
lated both physically and psychologically. The right to be
left alone (Warren and Brandeis 1890) preserves liberty
and autonomy as individuals are free to ‘‘develop person-
alities, goals, ideas, and the right to determine to whom
their thoughts, emotions, sentiments, and tangible products
are communicated’’ (Bloustein 1964, p. 18). Such a state of
solitary inaccessibility corresponds to defining privacy as
the ability to restrict access to personal information (e.g.,
Allen 1988) or as protection from information gathering
(Tavani and Moor 2001). Privacy as restricted access pre-
vents people from knowing certain things and implies en-
tering the public sphere to require giving up a measure of
privacy (Alfino and Mayes 2006). According to the
5 All members, even dissenting members, are obligated to abide by
the authentic microsocial contracts based not only on their explicit or
implicit consent when entering the community (Dunfee et al. 1999)
but also out of obligations of fairness (Phillips 1997). Contractors are
beholden to each other given the terms of these microsocial contracts
and obligated as a community to uphold the procedural hypernorms of
consent, exit, and voice (Donaldson and Dunfee 1999). For example,
illegitimate microsocial contracts would not be binding, e.g., a
microsocial contract that includes reading the personal email of
everyone of a particular age or gender or race. Such a microsocial
contract would violate the hypernorm of nondiscrimination and would
render the microsocial contract illegitimate. I wish to thank Tom
Donaldson for this example.
6 From an initial position, the narrative results in an agreement that
includes only those social constraints to human action that have
normative appeal—agreements that ‘‘reasonable agents could, and
arguably would, agree to if they had the choice’’ (Heugens et al. 2003,
p. 11). The narrative illustrates the internal morality of contracting by
walking through a precontractual state and demonstrating how
cooperation works (Van Oosterhout et al. 2006).
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restricted-access view of privacy in this original state, in-
dividuals either share information and make it public or do
not share information and keep it private.
Behavioral Tendencies
Such a state of inaccessibility is not sustainable as we may
minimally assume individuals have a behavioral tendency to
form relationships and coordinate activities (Dennett 1995; De
Waal and De Waal 1997). In other words, we do not have the
behavioral tendencies to live as a scattering of recluses. These
tendencies are so strong and integral to being human that a state
of perfect inaccessibility—or a completely solitary existence
where a person and their information is kept inaccessible from
others—is considered an extreme form of punishment today:
solitary confinement (Tufekci 2008a, b). Defining privacy as a
state of inaccessibility is neither practical nor desirable and,
ironically, renders privacy as a form of punishment.
As individuals naturally come together to form rela-
tionships, they share information. Human beings enjoy the
freedom to converse and trade information about one an-
other and have an interest in collecting information as well
as sharing information. Throughout privacy scholarship, a
need to share information for intimacy (Elgesem 1996,
p. 51), in order to have relationships (Fried 1968), and to
converse and trade information (Singleton 1998) pervades
justifications for privacy norms. Because the original state
of inaccessibility is inefficient for economic and social
actors (Posner 1981), information sharing becomes neces-
sary for relationships.7
Furthermore, discriminately sharing information affords
people the important power to determine both how close they
are to others and the nature of their relationships. Information
sharing is not only necessary to form relationships and trade,
but discriminately sharing allows individuals to differentiate
between relationships. Maintaining more than one relation-
ship becomes more complicated as individuals interact with
different types of people from different contexts or com-
munities. Individuals share different types and amounts of
information in order to negotiate the boundary conditions of
relationships (Samarajiva 1997). ‘‘The sort of relationship
that people have to one another involves…a conception of
the kind and degree of knowledge concerning one another
which it is appropriate for them to have’’ (Rachels 1975,
p. 294). Different relationships require different informa-
tion-sharing rules, and controlling who has access to
Table 2 Social contract narrative for expectations of privacy
Components of social contract narrative
Input Narrative Output
As applied to privacy as a social contract
Initial, precontractual state: inaccessibility;
scattering of recluses.
Characteristics of reasonable agents: to form
relationships and coordinate activities (Dennett
1995; De Waal and De Waal 1997)
Narrative: Individuals discriminately sharing and
knowing information to preserve an ideal sphere.
Reasons and interests that go into agreement:
(1) Preserve liberty and autonomy as individuals
are free to ‘‘develop personalities, goals, ideas,
and the right to determine to whom their thoughts,
emotions, sentiments, and tangible products are
communicated’’ (Bloustein 1964, p. 18)
(2) Share information for intimacy (Elgesem 1996,
p. 51), in order to have relationships (Fried 1968),
and to converse and trade information (Singleton
1998) friendship, intimacy, and trust (Fried 1968)




constraints on how information
flows.
Framework: what information is
shared with whom and how is it
used?
Social contract requirements voice, exit, consent. ? Sustainable, mutually beneficial agreements
Implications for business ethics
Expecting individuals to keep information
inaccessible is unsustainable and unrealistic.
Users, consumers, and employees need a way to
share relevant information to form relationships
and coordinate activities
Strong privacy norms and expectations are
necessary to preserve liberty and autonomy, to
develop personalities, and to develop different
relationships. Work in business ethics and
management seeking to justify privacy helps
support the narrative
Firm would need to support
stakeholders in maintaining their
microsocial contracts around
privacy
Social contract requirements notice and choice may fulfill social contract procedural minimums of consent; the ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ may fulfill
exit requirements
7 Sociologist Gerstein notes that individuals take on two roles in any
relationship—observer and participant—and mere observation is not
sufficient to form intimate relationships. Instead, individuals must
participate by sharing information in order to form relationships.
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personal information is necessary for friendship, intimacy,
and trust (Fried 1968) and preserves important human rela-
tionships (Nissenbaum 2004). As noted by technology
scholar James Moor, ‘‘different people may be given dif-
ferent levels of access for different kinds of information at
different times’’ (1997, p. 414).
Outcome: Framework for Privacy as a Social Contract
The social contract narrative illustrates the natural evolu-
tion of social contract norms around privacy. Based on this
narrative, individuals within a given community dis-
criminately share information with a particular set of
obligations in mind as to who has access to the information
and how it will be used (Nissenbaum 2004, 2009; Martin
2012; Sloan and Warner 2014). Based on the social con-
tract narrative, a framework for microsocial contract pri-
vacy norms centers on (1) the type of information, (2) who
has access to information, and (3) how the information is
used within a given community as explored below.
First, an ideal sphere lies around every individual where
trespasses can be seen as an insult to one’s honor (Simmel
1906, p. 321). Protecting that space can help create a
background for a self-creative enterprise (Bennett 1992).
Privacy law scholar Julie Cohen refers to this inviolate
space as the privacy of the home that affords ‘‘freedom of
movement that is both literal and metaphorical’’ (Cohen
2008, p. 195). This tension between the need to maintain
the ideal sphere around ourselves and the need to disclose
information for relationships and communities is sustained
through negotiated norms around the type of information.
Users on a site, such as Facebook or diaspora,* have an
expectation about the type of information collected—such
as GPS or browsing history or demographics.
Importantly, people retain the desire to limit who has
access to information. In other words, information known
to one person does not necessarily mean the information
is meant for all people. Sharing is not all or nothing but
‘optimal’ depending on maturity and scope of relationship
and the role of the individual (Brin 1999). Determining
who receives which piece of information keeps people
from being ‘‘misrepresented and judged out of context’’
(Rosen 2001, p. 21). Trying out different jokes, behaviors,
or personas with friends helps people to develop as in-
dividuals; but those same jokes, behaviors, or personas
could be damaging with a different population. Indi-
viduals are constantly deciding how to present themselves
at varying personal and social levels through agreements
about confidentiality (Stutzman and Hartzog 2012), while
retaining a desire for seclusion and a fear of intrusion
(Bambauer 2012). Online individuals need to dis-
criminately share information within a relationship with-
out fear of these behaviors or information being broadcast
broadly—or sold to data aggregators or retained for years.
In casual language, individuals talk about expectations of
confidentiality to signify the rules about which actors can
know particular information.
Finally, when individuals do reveal information to an
actor, rules and obligations govern not only who else
should receive the information but also how the infor-
mation is used (Hartzog 2011). These social contracts
around what, to whom, and for what purpose information
flows are the governing rules about privacy for a given
community. The purpose(s) of the community within
which the information is shared dictates the valid uses of
the information gathered or disclosed. Tracking GPS lo-
cation data by an application is valid when the application
is for directions or tracking your cycling route, but not
valid when the application is to simulate a flashlight.
When people attempt to assign property rights to control
information, they attempt to control how information is
later used.
These facets of privacy norms—the what, who, and
how—can be seen as working in concert within a given
relationship. Within a community or context, for every
given set of data, there exists a rule about who should be
privy to that information and the purpose for that infor-
mation. Similarly, for every given set of individuals, there
exists a set of information that is expected to be shared and
why. Key to these agreements is how the main components
work together (see Nissenbaum 2009). Within privacy as a
social contract, ‘‘who, what, and how’’ would identify a
particular micro privacy norm in a community.
From an original and unsustainable state of inaccessi-
bility, individuals have a need to discriminately share in-
formation in order to socialize, create relationships, form
groups, and trade. Individuals have a desire—and a rea-
sonable expectation—to be able to live within communities
while maintaining a sense of self. Just as communities
acknowledge freedom of movement simultaneous to a
protection from assault, individuals and society have an
interest of interacting in a community through sharing in-
formation while preserving space to develop themselves,
their relationships, and their communities.
(Re)conceptualizing Privacy Online
The social contract approach used here is a multilevel,
contextually rich framework allowing for specific con-
tractors within a contracting community the moral free
space to develop authentic and legitimate privacy norms
and expectations. And the social contract narrative is an
important step to understand the factors individuals take
into consideration when negotiating privacy microsocial
contract norms. Alternative approaches to privacy have
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been attractive because respecting and violating privacy are
clearly defined and easy to measure—privacy is violated
when information is either not controlled or no longer
inaccessible. Privacy as a social contract offers a more
nuanced, context-dependent understanding of privacy
while not venturing into the territory of relativism. To
explain, common privacy violations are redescribed below
given the social contract approach to privacy and outlined
in Tables 3 and 4.
Reframing Privacy Violations
Violation #1: Procedural Hypernorms
First, hypernorms can be violated by not adequately ad-
dressing the procedural and structural requirements for a
legitimate social contract. Microsocial contracts rely upon
procedural norms of adequate voice, exit, and informed
consent (Dunfee 2006), and the current focus online on
adequate notice and choice seeks to uphold minimal pre-
cepts of social contract’s procedural norms of exit, consent,
and voice. Online privacy notices, authentic consent, and
an ability to switch websites would address the procedural
hypernorms required in the macrosocial contract.
For example, researchers continually find violations to
procedural hypernorms online. Notices are unrealistically
time consuming (McDonald and Cranor 2008) and not al-
ways targeted toward consumers (Cranor et al. 2014).
Empirical studies have shown that notices are difficult if
not impossible to find by users (Leon et al. 2012) and
include misleading information (Leon et al. 2010). Re-
spondents do not understand notices to the point where
users are misled by icons and notices (Ur et al. 2012). And
respondents have been found to assume their privacy ex-
pectations are included in the notice (Martin 2014) or that
the advertising icon does more to protect their privacy than
in actuality (Leon et al. 2012).
Privacy as a social contract would suggest that focusing
on informed consent and the contractors’ right of exit and
voice are important, but not the only tactics to respect
privacy expectations. The procedural norms of consent,
exit, and voice are required for the micro-privacy social
contracts to be legitimate and to bind the members of the
community.8 However, much of the proverbial ‘heavy
lifting’ around privacy expectations is done within the
community in identifying and negotiating context-specific
privacy norms around who, what, and why information is
shared.
Violation #2: Microsocial Contracts
In addition, a violation of privacy would also include when
information is tracked, disseminated, or used against the
agreement of the actors within the community through a
breach of microsocial contracts. Given the framework of
micro privacy norms above, privacy violations occur when
the recipient of information—an organization, a user, or the
primary website—changes who is included in receiving
information, what information is shared, and how the in-
formation is used.
Change What Information is Shared Individuals retain a
desire to keep certain information inaccessible even within
defined relationships, yet new pieces of information be-
come available with advances in technology. In regards to
online surveillance, GPS data is now available from mobile
devices and tracked in addition to a user’s IP address or a
unique user identifier. A study of 101 popular applications
found that 47 transmitted phone location and 56 transmit-
ted a unique phone identifier to a third-party data aggre-
gator (Thurm and Kane 2010). In addition, websites can
identify and capture how individuals travel to a website,
where they click on a page, and where they travel after the
visit in addition to purchases and searches while on the site.
For example, Facebook began collecting and using user
browsing history—users’ online activities outside the
context of Facebook—in order to target advertising (Al-
bergotti 2014a). A recent study found that 31 % of appli-
cations gather information outside their purpose and
without a valid use (‘‘Backgrounder’’ 2014). Collecting
new information within an existing relationship may con-
stitute a privacy violation.
Change Who Receives the Information Individuals
regularly give access to information to some people or
some organizations while keeping the same information
from others. For example, Facebook’s Beacon program
took information about an individual’s browsing and buy-
ing habits with an online retailer, such as Amazon.com,
and sent alerts automatically to a new group of indi-
viduals—the Facebook user’s friends. The information
disclosed to Amazon.com (and others) was leaked to
Facebook friends, thereby changing the actors who re-
ceived the information. When a fitness application, Moves
(https://www.moves-app.com), was acquired by Facebook,
a new actor (Facebook) suddenly had access to the app’s
user information—much to their surprise (Wagner 2014).
Similarly, tagging photographs online allows new indi-
viduals to know about offline activities: by posting a pic-
ture and linking it to a subject’s name, offline activities are
suddenly available to individuals not present at the event.
Users do not relinquish information to an undefined group
8 I wish to thank Gaston de los Reyes for making this important point
on the role of the procedural hypernorms of exit, voice, and consent.
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of actors. Rather, individuals knowingly disclose infor-
mation to a particular set of actors within a community.
Change How the Information is Used Individuals have
an interest in how their information is used within a
community, and a line of scholarship has evolved to
equate privacy with the degree of control over personal
information. While problems abound with conceptual-
izing privacy as solely an intellectual property issue
(Bambauer 2012), the underlying premise that indi-
viduals have an interest in how their information is
used is sound and remains a strong focus in privacy
framed as a property right and the FIPs prevalent in
business.
For example, information given to a medical profes-
sional is to be used for medical diagnosis or for furthering
the medical field through research. If the medical profes-
sional were to sell that information to a pharmaceutical
company for marketing purposes or use that information to
sell the patient a car, the professional would breach the
terms of use within the social contract. Online, a user’s
travel history may be known to a website such as Orbitz
and can be used to analyze how individuals came to find
Orbitz for future Orbitz marketing or advertisements.










Website does not notify users of third-party
tracking
Initially, Facebook users had difficulty deleting
their accounts thereby removing the option to
‘exit’
Better designed notices such as P3P (Cranor
2012) that allows for consumer-friendly






Confidentiality Facebook’s Beacon program captured information
about individual’s browsing and buying habits
with an online retailer, e.g., Amazon.com, and
sent alerts automatically to a new group of indi-
viduals—the Facebook user’s friends
For example, when a fitness application, Moves
(https://www.moves-app.com), was acquired by
Facebook, a new actor (Facebook) suddenly had
access to the app’s user information—much to
their surprise (Wagner 2014)
TOR is free anonymizing software to securely
route traffic
Diaspora* social network does not sell access
to third parties





Secrecy GPS data is now regularly available from mobile
devices and tracked in addition to IP addresses
and a unique user identifier
For example, Facebook began collecting and using
user browsing history—online activities outside
the context of Facebook—in order to target
advertising (Albergotti 2014a). And, a recent
study found that 31 % of applications gather
information outside their purpose and without a
valid use (‘‘Backgrounder’’ 2014)
Diaspora* social network allows users to
remain anonymous






A user’s online activity may be passed to a website
such as Orbitz and used to prioritize search results
For example, Facebook manipulated the newsfeeds
of 700,000 to render the feed more positive or
negative and to measure the effect on users’
postings of those manipulations
Diaspora* social network allows users to retain
rights over their data







Legislative, substantive norms imposed from
outside the community. For example, Do Not
Track at the browser level
Regulation of substantive social contracts within
communities
Snapchat’s approach to native advertising to
not interfere with users’ conversations
(Shields 2014)
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However, using an individual’s online history to change
query results uses the known information in a novel way.
Research has shown users have privacy expectations
around both the type of information access as well as how
the information is used using mobile apps (Shilton and
Martin 2013) and online (Martin 2014). Further, when re-
spondents are shown the information that was collected and
aggregated about them online, respondents care about the
scope of use of even innocuous information online (Cranor
et al. 2014).
An infamous example of the misuse of legitimately
acquired information is the use of Facebook users’ data and
the users themselves in an experiment (Albergotti 2014b;
Meyer 2014). Facebook manipulated the newsfeeds of
700,000 users to be more positive or negative and then
measured the effect on users’ subsequent postings. The
postings were in the hands of a valid actor (Facebook and
the recipients of the post), but Facebook used the infor-
mation in a novel way thereby violating the microsocial
contract in the Facebook community around the expected
use of information.
Violation #3: Community or Contextual Integrity
(Nissenbaum 2009)
Social contract theory suggests a third level of privacy
violations in protecting the integrity of the boundaries of
the contracting community and their moral free space. In
other words, viewing privacy norms as a social contract
highlights the moral importance in protecting the bound-
aries of the context in Nissenbaum’s Privacy as Contextual
Integrity (2004, 2009) or moral free space of the commu-
nities. Within social contract theory, society has an obli-
gation to not develop and impose substantive norms on the
moral free space of the contractors. If outsiders to a con-
tracting community make substantive demands on the
content and flow of information, such outsiders would be
breaching the integrity of that moral free space. In fact,
such a privacy intrusion or violation is also referred to as a
violation of decisional privacy (Allen 1999) or passive
privacy (Floridi 2006) where the interference in autonomy
is considered a privacy violation. Broad regulations aimed
at too high a level may impose a standardized set of
Table 4 Analyzing privacy violations online using examples
Before design change:
Implicit privacy norms
Design change Post-design change:
Privacy violation
Sponsored Stories
What information The Facebook user’s approval of
an article, story, or advertisement
Facebook users who clicked on
‘like’ buttons had pictures of
themselves with an endorsement
sent to their friends in a
sponsored story
Same
Who receives information The ‘liked’ article, story, or
advertisement
Facebook user’s friends
How information is used To tally the popularity of an
article, story, or advertisement
on a third-party site
To market the article, story, or
product to Facebook friends
using relationship advertising
Orbitz
What information Website browsing history and
Orbitz purchase history
Orbitz tracks how users arrived at
their site in order to prioritize
search results
Same. Internet browsing history
might be new for some
Who receives information Orbitz Same
How information is used Remember recent searches,
targeted advertising for travel
locations, possible add-ons for
travel locations. Possibly for
Orbitz marketing purposes
To modify search results based on
the likelihood that the user is
price sensitive
Verizon
What information Call history, browsing history,
GPS/location of consumer
Verizon offers Precision Market
Insights to mine Verizon’s
customer call and browsing
information and map where
people are located and what
types of services they purchase
and use
Same
Who receives information Verizon Third party, business customers
interested in tracking the location
and purchase tendencies of their
customers
How information is used Billing, tracking for 911 calls For example, sports venue could
identify which people watching
the game are likely to leave via
different routes or purchase
paraphernalia by matching
spectators to Verizon’s records
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privacy norms across communities. For example, the
browser-level Do Not Track designation may not apply to
particular contexts and would interfere with the ability to
develop microsocial contracts within particular
communities.
Discussion
Privacy as a social contract constitutes a shift from viewing
sharing information online as dispositive of relinquishing
reasonable expectations of privacy to viewing sharing in-
formation online as a necessary part of strong community
and individual autonomy. As such, the use of a social
contract approach to privacy sheds light on weaknesses in
the traditional restricted access and control definitions of
privacy and also extends the important work within privacy
on privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2009).
Correcting Previous Views of Privacy
The access-view of privacy, where privacy is maintained
only by remaining inaccessible to others, requires indi-
viduals to relinquish privacy when interacting within their
community. Yet, research has shown users have privacy
expectations around both the type of information revealed
as well as how the information is used when online (Martin
2014) or when using mobile apps (Martin and Shilton,
2015). Respondents care about the scope of use of even
innocuous information online (Leon et al. 2013), view
tracking and online behavioral advertising as creepy (Ur
et al. 2012), and wish to not be tracked when online
(McDonald and Cranor 2010). Privacy as a social contract
allows for the fact that individuals disclose information
without relinquishing privacy.
Privacy as a social contract provides guidance post-
disclosure and allows for the interest of individuals both to
share information while having privacy expecta-
tions around how information is used and who has access
within a community. For example, Facebook tracking
users’ web browser history, experimenting with users’
newsfeed, and gaining access to user data of an acquired
application concerned previously disclosed information
that was, for the access-view of privacy, considered ‘pub-
lic.’’ Facebook’s violations are not captured with the ac-
cess-view of privacy but are explained with privacy as a
social contract as a breach of microsocial contract norms
and as explored in Table 3 above.
The control-view of privacy, most often operationalized
through adequate notification and consumer choice, as-
sumes that individuals maintain control over their infor-
mation by reading a privacy notice and choosing the
website whose privacy practices most closely match their
preferences. Yet considerable agreement exists that notice
and choice has failed to govern privacy effectively online
(Martin 2013; Nissenbaum 2011; Calo 2012; Solove 2013).
Consumers fall victim to becoming a ‘captive audience’
without functional opt-out mechanisms thereby making
notice and choice less meaningful (Popescu and Barah
2013). Perhaps most damning, 91 % of respondents feel as
though they have lost control of their data (Madden et al.
2014). In fact, the infamous Facebook experiment con-
formed to the broad statements in Facebook’s privacy
policy (Elder 2014).
Not only are the access-view and control-view of pri-
vacy lacking in descriptive validity, the views of privacy
may guide firms in the wrong direction to meet privacy
expectations of users. Currently, the only affirmative re-
sponsibility of firms online is adequate notification (Calo
2012; Beales and Eisenach 2013). Firms online are not
responsible for their specific privacy practices—only in
communicating their tactics to consumers. In focusing on
disclosure as the main responsibility of the firm, firms
become free to implement questionable privacy practices
so long as the practices are accurately reported. However,
the social contract narrative suggests that individuals have
an interest in discriminately sharing information with limits
as to who knows and how it is used, thus changing how
managers and management researchers would frame pri-
vacy violations and judge privacy expectations.
Extending Privacy as Contextual Integrity
The social contract approach to privacy also extends con-
text-dependent theories of privacy, such as privacy as
contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2009). Privacy as a so-
cial contract offers a mechanism to judge privacy norms
and, in doing so, addresses charges of relativism endemic
to contextually dependent theories of privacy. First, locally
negotiated social contracts are always beholden to proce-
dural universal principles to remain legitimate (Van
Oosterhout et al. 2006). Therefore, microsocial contract
privacy norms must also abide by the universal and thin
second order norms such as the rights of consent, voice,
and exit (Donaldson and Dunfee 1995; Dunfee 2006;
Heugens et al. 2006). As such, contracting has an internal
morality without the need for external substantive guid-
ance—for some (Van Oosterhout et al. 2006).9
9 In fact, rather than substantive macro norms to guide thick micro
privacy norms, Walzer positions minimal, thin guiding principles as a
product of repeated social contract norms. According to Walzer,
‘‘moral terms have minimal and maximal meanings (1994, p. 2)
where minimalist meanings are embedded in the maximal morality
and designate ‘‘some reiterated features of particularly thick of
maximal moralities’’ (Walzer 1994, p. 10). This minimalism is
‘‘reasonable enough and universal enough, has no imperial
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In addition, locally negotiated privacy norms, i.e., mi-
crosocial contracts, can be analyzed through both actual
and hypothetical social contracts to address ‘‘norms of
decency, etiquette, sociability, convention, and morality’’
(Nissenbaum 2004; see also, Tavani 2008; Dunfee 2006).
While privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2004,
2009) focuses on the actual negotiated privacy norms, a
social contract approach adds a possible additional layer of
analysis in the form of the hypothetical social contract
which would have moral weight. We could ask, what pri-
vacy norms would reasonable individuals agree to, given
minimal social contract standards of consent, voice, and
exit?
These hypothetical microsocial contracts should lever-
age existing empirical work on privacy expectations, in-
terests, and preferences. For example, we can ask, ‘‘would
users of Facebook expect their browsing histories to be
used for targeted advertising?’’ regardless of what practices
were communicated in the privacy policy (Albergotti
2014a). Considering the fact that 80 % of respondents are
concerned third parties accessing data they share (Madden
et al. 2014), we would be able to presume Facebook users
would be concerned with third parties accessing their data.
Finally, locally negotiated privacy norms must meet the
interests of the contractors to discriminately share infor-
mation as illustrated within the narrative above. Similarly,
Helen Nissenbaum highlights the important purpose of the
community in guiding appropriate privacy norms. Nis-
senbaum further suggests judging privacy norms based on,
first, the promotion of goods and values within the context
and, second, meeting ‘‘fundamental social, political, and
moral values’’ (2009, p. 128). Within social contract the-
ory, the criterion of mutually beneficial and sustainable
local norms (Van Oosterhout et al. 2006) also suggests a
required fit within the community’s goals or purpose is an
important factor to consider in judging privacy norms.
Similarly, one of the two key assumptions in the con-
struction of the macrosocial contract and the moral free
space within a community by Donaldson and Dunfee
(1999) is the need for a moral fabric supportive of (1)
efficiency and (2) preexisting core values of the
community.
Implications and Conclusion
In relying on notice and choice to assuage privacy con-
cerns, a firm’s only role in respecting privacy expectations
online was to ensure a user was adequately notified and the
consent of the user was acquired. This gives firms the
perverse incentive to construct elaborately vague privacy
notices, left unread and misunderstood by users, only to
gain users’ consent. With individuals and consumers ren-
dering privacy judgments regardless of the explicit privacy
notices, the prominent tool available for businesses to
manage privacy expectations is rendered ineffective.
Within a social contract approach to privacy, the focus
shifts from firms gaining consent to the role and respon-
sibilities of businesses as contractors in communities. From
the narrative above, rules around discriminately sharing
information take into consideration the possible benefits to
the individual (such as better relationships, trading for
goods and services, employment, etc.) as well as the ben-
efits to the contracting community (such as a banking
system, a functioning workplace, a credit system, a mar-
ketplace, etc.) while also balancing the expected harms.
Understanding this privacy analysis will help firms better
meet the privacy expectations of their stakeholders. Im-
portantly for researchers and firms, questions remain about
how to identify microsocial contract norms about privacy
and what is taken into consideration in forming those pri-
vacy norms.
The implications to privacy research and practice based
on social contract concepts are examined below and out-
lined in Table 5.
Implications for Research
Both the restricted-access and control approaches may be
considered universal principles or ‘strong’ definitions of
privacy where the definition of what it means to respect
privacy—remaining inaccessible or adhering to notice
statements—is universally known and applicable. This is
problematic in that performing research on privacy be-
comes an exercise in testing an individual’s belief in a
predefined and arbitrary conception of privacy. For ex-
ample, it has become almost cliche´ to declare young adults
to have diminished or no privacy expectations, yet, when
examined closely, young adults are found to have privacy
norms that differ from older adults while retaining strong
expectations of privacy (Hoofnagle et al. 2010). Similarly,
individuals who do not agree with the analyst’s definition
of privacy are presumed to not find privacy important (e.g.,
Acquisti and Grossklags 2005) or to be unethical (Winter
et al. 2004). Instead, researchers and organizations should
ask what are the privacy expectations of the users, cus-
tomers, or employees in this situation? rather than do users,
Footnote 9 continued
tendencies; it doesn’t aspire to global rule, it leaves room’’ (Walzer
1994, p. 64). It is less the product of persuasion than of mutual
recognition across spaces (Walzer 1994, p. 17). We can think of the
content of macrosocial contracts as the result of a numberless accu-
mulation of psychological contracts that individuals have socially
constructed over time (Thompson and Hart 2006, p. 233).
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customers, or employees have any reasonable expectation
of privacy here?
Scholarship that operationalizes relinquishing privacy as
when users provide information misses the expectations
consumers have even once they provide information—even
innocuous information (Leon et al. 2013). In other words,
researchers will observe a respondent who is willing to
purchase something online and equate that behavior with a
demonstration that he/she is less concerned about privacy.
When asked, as shown above in the studies, respondents go
online and have expectations of privacy.
A social contract approach would be particularly well
suited to the stakeholders and issues of organizations and
managers. However, little empirical work has been done to
test a social contract approach to privacy, since social
contract approaches, in general, remain empirically chal-
lenged (Dunfee 2006; Glac and Kim 2009; Van Oosterhout
et al. 2006; Soule 2002). This is due to the fact that al-
lowing for locally defined norms renders contextual ap-
proaches to privacy difficult to test empirically. The
identification of the relevant community and local
authentic norms is ‘‘partially if not entirely’’ an empirical
task (Husted 1999). Additional inductive research to
identify the particular privacy norms within a community
or context would help organizations meet privacy expec-
tations of users, employees, and customers.
Implications for Practice
Responsibility of Firms
Current approaches to online privacy place the onus on the
consumer to understand and acknowledge the privacy no-
tices or to choose wisely where and when they give access to
their information. In other words, the responsibility for the
handoff of information is placed primarily on the consumer.
Once privacy is viewed as the social contract between parties
about the type and flow of information within a given com-
munity, privacy becomes attached primarily to a relationship
rather than to a piece of data or location.
In the case of privacy online, the relationship between
the website and the user becomes critical to upholding
Table 5 Implications to research and practice
Social contract
concept
Within a social contract
approach to privacy




Privacy norms are developed
within a particular
community of actors. That
community is
circumscribed by a
common set of goals,
purpose, and value system
Privacy concerns and
expectations are uniform




Tactics to address online
privacy expectations
should be dependent on
the context of the
exchange
For privacy research, survey
questions should be tailored to a
particular context or community
rather than remain general. More
inductive research is needed to
identify the expectations in a
particular community rather than
test for conformity to the access-
view or control-view of privacy
Microcontract
norms
Individuals have a continuing
interest in discriminately
sharing information about
who has access for what
information and how it is
used











Users do not relinquish
information without an
expectation about how
that information will be
used within that context
No area exists where
‘‘anything goes’’
More work would need to examine
the privacy expectations of users
with disclosed information.
Researchers and organizations
should ask what are the privacy
expectations of the users,
customers, or employees in this
situation? Rather than do users
customers, or employees have




Actors, such as firms, within
a community have a
responsibility to uphold and
develop privacy
expectations
Expectations can be dynamic
and change over time
requiring constant re-




The responsibility for the
handoff of information is
placed primarily on the
consumer
Privacy expectations
are set with notice when
users hand off
information
In the case of privacy
online, the relationship
between the website and
the user becomes critical
to upholding privacy
expectations




More longitudinal studies to help
firms identify whether and how
privacy expectations change over
time and with new innovations.
Research should focus on the
responsibility of all
contractors—including websites
and online actors tracking
information
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privacy expectations. All contractors—users and organi-
zations—have a right and an obligation as both the re-
cipient of information and as the disseminator of
information to abide by the particular privacy norms within
that community or to voice objection. Primary websites
have the knowledge, access, and incentives to become
more responsible regarding their users’ overall privacy
experience online.
As noted by Dunfee Dunfee et al. (1999, p. 32) and Van
Oosterhout and Heugens (2009, p. 731), merely enjoying
the benefits of the community, engaging in transaction
within the community, and reaping the benefits of the
structure offered by the microsocial contracts within the
community entails a reciprocal obligation to uphold and
develop the authentic norms of the community. Firms
reaping the benefits of users, consumers, and employees
from their disclosures of information have an obligation to
respect the privacy norms within their community. For
example, Facebook partners with many retail, gaming,
search, and news sites to allow a Facebook login on these
third-party sites. However, Facebook negotiated that these
partners are not permitted to transfer any information to
AdNetworks or data brokers based on their Facebook
users’ login. In addition, Facebook also uses technology to
detect attempts to scrape, or copy, their members’ profiles
thereby taking responsibility to manage their users’ online
experience. However, Facebook’s purchase of the fitness
app Move, and attempt to access Move’s user data (Wagner
2014), calls into question whether Facebook prioritizes the
role and responsibility of the website’s relationship with
users or, instead, prioritizes Facebook’s needs.
‘‘Anything Goes’’ Fallacy (Nissenbaum 2004)
According to the narrative offered, the decision to share
information is not dispositive of relinquishing a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Instead, individuals have an interest
in discriminately sharing information. For privacy re-
search, more work would need to examine the privacy
expectations of users with disclosed information. Both the
traditional control and restricted-access approach to pri-
vacy approaches treat the act of sharing information as
dispositive of relinquishing an expectation of privacy: in-
dividuals either share information and lose a right to pri-
vacy or do not share information and retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The narrative offered here suggests
shifting the conversation to view individuals as always
having an interest in discriminately sharing information.
The question for firms becomes how to support individuals
discriminately sharing information within a particular
context or community. For example, selling behavioral
information may be appropriate for retail websites but not
for financial services, as MasterCard and Visa learned
when they approached companies with selling personalized
information (Steel 2011).
For privacy as a social contract, no area exists where
‘‘anything goes’’ (Nissenbaum 2004). Any community has
prevailing privacy norms and associated reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy that are the product of either explicit
or implicit negotiations. Rather than create the false pos-
sibility of a region where anything goes online, a social
contract approach to privacy suggests that information is
always governed by the norms of a particular community.
Privacy as a social contract—or a mutually beneficial
agreement within a community about how information is
used and shared—suggests that tactics to address online
privacy expectations should be dependent on the context of
the exchange. This diverges from tactics that seek to ad-
dress privacy issues online as if privacy concerns and ex-
pectations are uniform. For example, a banking website
will have different privacy norms from a retail website.
Similarly, a gaming website might have more in common
with a social networking site than a retail site. The purpose
of the website will influence the privacy expectations for
the users and empirical studies may be required to identify
the microsocial contract norms around privacy—as has
been called for in scholarship (Dunfee 2006).
Privacy as a Competitive Advantage
The development of mutually beneficial privacy norms by
contractors is a competitive advantage within communities.
In order to keep people actively participating in relation-
ships and trade within a particular community, privacy
rules develop around who is privy to which piece of in-
formation and the obligations associated with knowing that
piece of information. Sociologist Schwartz notes that pri-
vacy rules are necessary within any stable social system as
he suggests that privacy agreements should be viewed as an
index of solidarity (1968). In other words, strong privacy
norms make strong communities.
The larger community also benefits from individuals
retaining ‘a backstage’ or a private self (Goffman 1959;
Nissenbaum 2004) while also sharing information.10
Communities—including those of a firm—benefit when
websites and users, husbands and wives, work groups, or
teams develop their particular privacy expectations and
norms. In fact, ‘‘part of what makes a society a good place
to live is the extent to which it allows people freedom from
10 Similarly, Dunbar (1998) proposes that gossip, people-curiosity
and small talk, all of which are seemingly nonfunctional and are often
popularly understood as mere distraction or deviation, are in essence
the human version of social grooming in primates: an activity that is
essential to forging bonds, affirming relationships, displaying bonds,
and asserting and learning about hierarchies and alliances. See
Tufekci (2008a, b): ‘‘Grooming, Gossip, Facebook and Myspace.’’
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intrusiveness of others’’ (Regan 2011). As Priscilla Regan
notes, ‘‘on a societal level, people require a measure of
understanding of how they relate to others that permits the
development of a sense of self and connectedness to others
within the society of which they are a part.’’ Without rules
governing how information should move within a given
community or relationship, individuals withdraw
(Schwartz 1968). This approach is Deweyan in acknowl-
edging that both individuals and society benefit from par-
ticular protection of privacy rather than positioning the
interests of parties as opposing forces (see also Nissenbaum
2004; Regan 2011; Solove 2006).
On a smaller scale, this competitive advantage can be
seen in the introduction of privacy-aware products and
services. For example, DuckDuckGo is ‘‘the search engine
that doesn’t track you’’ (www.duckduckgo.com). Diaspo-
ra* (www.diasporafoundation.org) is a decentralized social
network that differentiates based on freedom and privacy:
users access diaspora* through user-supported servers (or
pods), using pseudonyms, and with full rights over the use
of their data.11 In addition, Whisper, an app that allows
users to share thoughts anonymously, was caught tracking
users (Dwoskin 2014); yet a competitor, Secrets, noted
their business model does not include developing rela-
tionships with media outlets and therefore will not have the
incentive to monetize tracking of users. Similarly, Snap-
chat attempted to distance themselves from other social
media services by not using native advertising: instead ads
are ‘‘compartmentalized’’ and not based on collected user
data (Shields 2014). Table 3 includes the examples of the
products and services in the market seeking to responsibly
contract in their community by engineering privacy into
their product—as has been called for in research (Mayer
and Narayanan 2013) and public policy (Ohlhausen 2014).
Limitations and Concerns
Because privacy norms may be locally defined within a
particular community, charges of relativism are endemic to
a social contract approach. The lack of substantive princi-
ples to guide the development of local norms leave some to
find a lack of moral authority (Wempe 2005; Soule 2002;
Dunfee 2006) and allow ‘‘morally rogue agreements’’
(Soule 2002). Locally developed privacy norms can be
perceived as losing moral authority because the norms are
tied to practice or convention (Nissenbaum 2004). Van
Oosterhout et al. (2006) refer to this assumption as the
‘contractualist fallacy,’ or the ‘‘erroneous assumption that
the contractualist argumentative structure uniquely deter-
mines a single set of action-guiding norms’’ (p. 522).
However, other approaches to social contracts do not
view contracting as ‘‘a morally neutral idea’’ (Van
Oosterhout et al. 2006, p. 528). In fact, the social contract
narrative illustrates what Van Oosterhout et al. (2006) refer
to as ‘the internal morality of contracting’ by walking
through a ‘precontractual state of nature without coop-
eration and demonstrate how cooperation works.’’ There-
fore, substantive privacy principles are not needed,
according to Nissenbaum (2004), Van Oosterhout et al.
(2006), and Van Oosterhout and Heugens (2009), in order
to have moral gravity. The internal morality defines a
moral threshold for microsocial contracting that enables us
to filter out contracts and practices incompatible with the
moral import of contracting (Van Oosterhout et al. 2006).
Instead, contractualists ‘‘focus on the reasonable and nor-
mative foundations of contractual schemes’’ (Van Ooster-
hout et al. 2006, p. 521). The goal of the contractualist
endeavor is not to identify the single right answer, but to
identify legitimate and authentic agreements.
In addition, the demarcation where one community
starts and another stops is not clear at times. In fact, a
social contract approach to privacy introduces the possi-
bility of conflicting norms of privacy and overlapping
communities similar to other social contract theories.
Overlapping spaces and conflicting norms/duties are en-
demic limitations for social contract approaches (Phillips
and Johnson-Cramer 2006). Future research on privacy as a
social contact would need to take such overlapping com-
munities into consideration.
The evolution of thick privacy norms may be seen as a
problem for some, since a social contract approach to
privacy leads to an increase in stability and a tendency
toward the status quo. Social contract approaches can be
viewed as lacking a mechanism for revising micro norms
(Phillips and Johnson-Cramer 2006) or, as Nissenbaum
notes in reference to privacy as contextual integrity, a
tendency toward conservatism (Nissenbaum 2004). Chan-
ges are initially resisted as ‘‘entrenched normative frame-
work represents a settled rationale’’ (Nissenbaum 2004,
p. 127).
Yet for Michael Walzer, agreements ‘‘change over time
as a result of internal tension and external example; hence
they are always subject to dispute’’ (Walzer 1994, p. 27). In
fact, others see social contract approaches to include dy-
namism as an asset rather than a hindrance and position the
norm of forgiveness as critical to sustainable solutions
(Van Oosterhout et al. 2006). Most clearly, Daniel Dennett
suggests an evolutionary story with a mutation arising
‘‘instead of persisting in the myopically selfish policies of
mutual defection and distrust that had reigned heretofore,
these particular lucky competitors hit upon a new idea:
11 These attributes also make diaspora* attractive to terrorist groups
such as IS (aka ISIL or ISIS)—the decentralized nature of the
infrastructure makes banishing a terrorist group almost impossible
(Lee 2014).
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cooperation for mutual benefit’’ (Dennett 1995, p. 454). All
social contract theorists ‘‘agree in seeing morality to be, in
one way or another, an emergent product of a major in-
novation in perspective.’’ Where Rawls sees a stable
agreement that cannot be upset in the form of reflective
equilibrium, such stability creates problems for Phillips and
Johnson-Cramer in their analysis of ISCT within business
ethics (2006); and Dennett never commits to such stability
and talks of evolutionary nature. Importantly here, both
assumptions of stability and dynamism are possible within
the arguments herein, however Dennett’s assumption about
human behavioral tendencies are more in line with the
social contract narrative above.
Conclusion
This paper examined how privacy norms develop through a
social contract narrative in order to reframe possible pri-
vacy violations given the social contract approach to pri-
vacy and critically examine the role of business as a
contractor in developing privacy norms. These social
contracts are important to understand if firms are going to
adequately manage the privacy expectations of stakehold-
ers. Most importantly, focusing on the microsocial con-
tracts around privacy expectations shifts the responsibility
of firms from adequate notification and gaining consent of
the individuals to the responsibilities of the firm as a
contractor to maintain a mutually beneficial and sustainable
solution. The social contract approach to privacy has im-
portant practical implications for firms struggling to iden-
tify the privacy expectations of stakeholders.
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